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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
Nos. 16-1369 & 16-3259
___________
NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
v.
REBECCA LEGAULT; FRANCESCO PAPALEO;
ALFRED W. RICCO a/k/a SHARON PAIGE
Sharon Paige a/k/a Alfred Ricco,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:15-cv-00736)
District Judge: Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 1, 2017
Before: RESTREPO, SCIRICA and FISHER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 2, 2017)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

New York Life Insurance Company (“New York Life”) filed an interpleader
complaint to request that the District Court determine the rightful beneficiary of two
annuities it had issued to Marvin Samuels, M.D., who died in 2014. New York Life
named three putative beneficiaries: Samuels’ niece, Rebecca Legault; his former
domestic partner, Francesco Papaleo; and his friend, Sharon Paige, a.k.a. Alfred Ricco.
After Paige filed an answer to the complaint, Legault filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. The District Court granted the motion insofar as Paige was dismissed from the
case and barred from asserting any claim to the annuities or any claim against Legault
relating to the annuities. Paige twice sought reconsideration of the decision without
success. Subsequently, Legault and Papaleo reached a settlement, and the District Court
ordered the distribution of funds to them.1 Paige appeals.2
We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise
plenary review over the District Court’s ruling on the motion for judgment on the
pleadings. See Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 535 (3d Cir. 2002). We review an order
denying reconsideration for abuse of discretion. See Max’s Seafood Café ex rel LouAnn, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999).

On Paige’s motion, the distribution of the funds has been stayed until the resolution of
this matter on appeal.
1

2

Paige twice filed a notice of appeal, once after the orders denying reconsideration of the
initial decision dismissing her from the action (opening C.A. No. 16-1369), and once
after the final order directing the payment of funds to Legault and Papaleo (opening C.A.
No. 16-3259). Initially, we dismissed C.A. No. 16-1369 for an apparent want of
jurisdiction, but we later vacated that order and consolidated the two appeals.
2

The District Court properly granted Legault’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings against Paige. As the District Court stated, there was no dispute that Legault
was the last named beneficiary of both annuities. And, as the District Court explained,
there was no dispute about whether Samuels made every reasonable effort to change the
beneficiary from Legault to Paige. See Alkhafaji v. TIAA-CREF Individual &
Institutional Servs., LLC, 69 A.3d 219, 222 (Pa. 2013) (explaining that, under
Pennsylvania law, a beneficiary change can be made either by strictly complying with
policy terms or by making “every reasonable effort to comply with the notice
requirements of the policy”).
Furthermore, on appeal, Paige does not argue that Samuels named her as a
beneficiary; instead, she disavows any argument that she or Samuels caused or sought to
remove Legault as the beneficiary. See, e.g., Reply Brief at 8. Her arguments for relief
center on how New York Life should have treated information about Samuels’ granting
her power-of-attorney and on how New York Life should have given her access to the
funds on the day before Samuels’ death for Samuels’ medical care and personal and legal
needs. Those arguments do not undermine the District Court’s conclusion. Likewise,
Paige’s claim that the judgment against her deprived her of pursuing a compulsory
counterclaim against New York Life is not a reason to vacate the judgment. Paige did
not include any counterclaim in her answer to New York Life’s interpleader complaint.
The District Court also properly denied reconsideration. Reconsideration is
warranted under limited circumstances, such as when a litigant shows “(1) an intervening
3

change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available
when the court [ruled]; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent
manifest injustice.” Max’s Seafood Cafe by Lou-Ann, Inc., 176 F.3d at 677 (citation
omitted). As the District Court explained, the evidence that Paige presented in her first
motion for reconsideration could not be properly considered as new, but even if it were so
considered, it did not support reconsideration. See Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. v.
Dougherty, 986 F. Supp. 928, 931 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (citing Garland v. Craven, 41 A.2d
140 (Pa. 1945), for the proposition that a “mere declaration of intent” is insufficient to
effect a beneficiary change). As the District Court noted in regards to the second motion
for reconsideration, Paige was essentially attempting to get the proverbial “second bite of
the apple.” Also, we note that in that motion for reconsideration, as in this appeal, Paige
stated that she did not assert to be a beneficiary.
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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